Consequentialism, Deontology, and Inevitable Trade-offs :: Philosophy Essays

Consequentialism, Deontology, and Inevitable Trade-offsABSTRACT Recently, frantic consequentialism has been defended against the charge that it leads to unacceptable guile-offs by showing a trade-off authorized by m whatsoever of us is not justified by any of the usual nonconsequenlist arguments. The particular trade-off involves raising the speed limit on the Interstate Highway System. As a society, we seemingly accept a trade-off of lives for convenience. This defense of consequentialism may be a tu quoque, only if it does take exception nonconsequentialists to adequately justify a multitude of social decisions. Work by the deontologist Frances Kamm, conjoined with a perspective deployed by several economists on the proportion between social follows and lives lost, is relevant. It provides a starting point by justifying decisions which involve trading lives only for otherwise lives. But the perspective withal recognizes that using resources in excess of some figure (perhap s as pitiful as $7.5 million) to drop a line a life causes us to forego other live-saving activities, thus causing a net loss of life. Setting a speed limit as low as 35 miles per minute of arc might indeed save some lives, but the loss of productivity due to the increased time spent in travel would appeal an even capaciouser number of lives. Therefore, many trade-offs do not patently involve trading lives for some lesser value (e.g., convenience), but ar justified as allowing some to die in order to save a greater number. It has long been one of the standard criticisms of consequentialist approaches to ethics that they also easily justify trade-offs that are morally unacceptable. The criticism which holds the end justifies the fashion philosophy inherent in consequentialism to be a source of great immorality is expressed, for example, in the famous scene from Dostoyevskys The Brothers Karamazov. Remember how Alyosha reacts to the prospect offered by Ivan of a harmonious w orld order, a system that would bring intimately peace and rest and happiness for all men. A lovely idea, but the structure comes at the price of torturing one tiny tiddler to death. And Alyosha go forth not consent to that exchange.A consequentialist response to Alyoshas refusal to consent to trade the suffering and death of one innocent in exchange for oecumenic harmony is that, in the present inharmonious order, many innocent children will die horribly, not just one. Alyoshas tender conscience will cost thousands of innocent children their lives. And so the debate continues.Recently, however, a proponent of consequentialism, Alastair Norcross, has sharpened the debate.